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A BST R A C T 
Public procurement serves as the means by which public goods and 
services are acquired through contracts with private firms, as well as a 
means by which governments promote policies such as socioeconomic 
diversity. In the U.S., diversity goals are pursued through preferences for 
contract awards by public agencies to businesses owned by members of 
disadvantaged groups, such as Native Americans, women, and disabled 
veterans. In this paper we argue that the extent to which these policies 
are realized depends substantially on implementation²specifically, on 
agency contracting capacity. Given current deficiencies in federal 
agency contracting capacity, diversity governance is largely missing. 
Rather, agencies use minority-based preferences in order to reduce their 
workload, thereby awarding contracts for convenience rather than to 
redress disadvantage and discrimination.  We demonstrate that, when 
agencies use these expedient measures to sidestep the intent of public 
policy, they risk diverting contracts from deserving to undeserving firms.  
Unless agencies increase their contacting capacity, diversity governance 
in this important area of public administration will remain impoverished.     
  
PAQ FALL 2013  394 
  
  
IN T R O DU C T I O N 
 
)LIWHHQ \HDUV DJR WKH 6XSUHPH &RXUW¶V GHFLVLRQ LQ
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena (1995) was interpreted as a 
³PDMRU VHWEDFN´ 5LFH DQG0RQJNXR   IRU DIILUPDWLYH
action initiatives intended to address discrimination of minority-
owned businesses in federal contracting.  In Adarand, the Court 
set a high sWDQGDUGRI³VWULFWVFUXWLQ\´IRUMXVWLILFDWLRQRIPLQRULW\
preferences in federal contracts²a ruling that, according to Rice 
and Mongkuo (1998), would weaken and in some cases eliminate 
these preferences (83).   
Today, however, data indicate that these fears have not 
materialized; levels of federal contract awards to minority-owned 
businesses have continued to increase (Federal Procurement Data 
System-Next Generation [FPDS-NG] 2011).  In this article, we 
explain that this outcome has little to do with the success of federal 
agencies in meeting $GDUDQG¶V strict scrutiny standard for 
minority preferences. Rather, agencies have continued to take 
advantage of the expedited contract award authorities that 
accompany minority preference programs²authorities that help 
UHGXFHDJHQFLHV¶ZRUNORDG$VDFRQVHTXHQFHERWKWKH&RXUW¶V
standards and the intent of Congress to redress past discrimination 
take a back seat to transaction cost considerations when agencies 
make minority contract awards. The continued use of these 
expedited authorities is to be expected, especially when, as we will 
show, agencies suffer from a lack of organizational contracting 
capacity.   
Governance of diversity in federal contracting has thus 
become more an exercise in expedience and convenience than in 
recognizing and redressing disadvantage and discrimination. 
When agencies focus inwardly on their own interests of efficiency 
rather than outwardly on the public they are supposed to serve, 
SHUFHSWLRQVRIJRYHUQPHQW¶VFRPPLWPHQWWRHQKDQFLQJPLQRUity 
opportunities via federal contracting are eroded.  This failure of 
diversity governance reflects a failure to invest in the capacity to 
govern²more specifically, in the capacity to contract as 
constituted in people and organizational processes.  Unless federal 
agencies increase their contracting capacities, they will likely 
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continue to rely heavily on minority preference programs, mainly 
for the sake of convenience.   
We begin with a brief review of public sector contracting 
as an important function of public administration and as a means 
for accomplishing public policy objectives. In the discussion, we 
also address organizational contracting capacity; specifically, how 
it has been lacking in federal agencies and how it may be 
increased.  We then review the legislative-regulatory context of 
policies and policy objectives related to minority contracting, 
along with some difficulties in their implementation. Next we turn 
to describe the judicial context by documenting some important 
court decisions that would be expected to shape those policies and 
their implementation in significant ways.  We present data that 
indicates, however, that the court decisions have had apparently 
negligible effects.  We explain this result in terms of agencies 
seeking to reduce their contracting workload because of 
inadequate capacity, and we present and discuss an illustrative 
case study. We conclude the article with comments on 
connections between diversity governance, discretion, and the 
capacity to contract. 
In this article, we use the term small disadvantaged 
businesses (SDB) to refer generally to those small businesses 
owned by minorities and groups that are the targets of federal 
preferences.1 We also limit our analysis to contracting by U.S. 
federal agencies, although many of the issues will apply to state 
and local jurisdictions as well as to government agencies in other 
nations. 
 
C U L T UR A L C O MPE T E N C Y A ND M IN O RI T Y 
C O N T R A C T IN G 
 
The increasing attention during the past decade to cultural 
competency in public administration and management (see, for 
example, Benavides and Hernandez 2007; Carrizales 2010; 
Norman-Major and Gooden 2012; Rice 2004, 2005, 2007, 2008) 
provides motivation and grounding for our analysis and 
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arguments. Cultural competency addresses the ability of public 
agencies and administrators to serve their customers, clients, and 
constituents in contexts and situations of diversity, such as in 
cross- and multi-cultural settings (Carrizales 2010, 16). With 
regard to minority-based contracting, an emphasis on cultural 
competency would serve several purposes, such as addressing 
inadequate delivery of public contracts to minority groups; 
increasing the relevance of agencies to the minority groups they 
serve; and better preparing agency contracting officials to do their 
jobs (Rice 2007, 44).       
Minority contracting preferences emerged, as we note 
below, in the late 1960s during roughly the same period that social 
equity came to the fore as a priority for the New Public 
Administration (Frederickson 2007). For a variety of reasons, 
however, contracting and procurement as areas of administrative 
theory, education, and practice have remained relatively 
undeveloped (Snider and Rendon 2012). Thus, the contracting 
function of public administration as a means to promote social 
equity has largely been neglected within the field. We see the 
recent focus on cultural competency as a potential corrective to 
this neglect to the extent that attention is drawn to minority-based 
contracting as an important facet of diversity governance. 
 
PUB L I C A D M INIST R A T I O N  
A ND T H E C O N T R A C T IN G F UN C T I O N 
 
 &RQWUDFWLQJ¶V LPSRUWDQFH DV D IXQFWLRQ RI SXEOLF
administration is evident in many ways. First, contracting 
activities and offices are found in almost all U.S. federal, state, 
and local government agencies (Thai 2001); the number of public 
administrators working in contracting in the U.S. totals more than 
500,000 (NIGP 2011). Second, the amount of resources devoted 
to contracting is compelling.  In the U.S., contracting accounts for 
roughly 15% of the total annual federal budget (FPDS-NG 2011). 
Contracting has accounted for about one third of Recovery Act 
spending (Bartha and Snider 2010).  Finally, contracting accounts 
for a wide range of products, from municipal services (Fernandez 
2007) to major weapon systems such as ships, aircraft, and tanks 
for national defense (Rendon and Snider 2008). The effectiveness 
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of the contracting function largely determines the effectiveness of 
these products and services (Shick and Weikart 2009; Van Slyke 
2002). 
Scholars have recognized contracting as a critical 
administrative function (Gordon, Zemansky, and Sekwat 2000; 
McCue and Gianakis 2001; Snider 2006; Thai 2001), and that 
achievement of certain public policy objectives (e.g., supporting 
GRPHVWLF VXSSOLHUV SURPRWLRQ RI VXVWDLQDEOH RU ³JUHHQ´
procurement) depends substantially on contracting and its 
effectiveness (Arrowsmith 1995; Bolton 2006; Knight, Caldwell, 
Harland, and Telgren 2003; Knight, Harland, et al. 2007). From 
this perspective, each contracting decision (e.g., whether to 
privatize; which firm to select for a contract award) is political, as 
LWHQWDLOVDQ³DXWKRULWDWLYHDOORFDWLRQRIYDOXH´(Easton 1953).  
Scholars have also noted that the role of contracting has 
expanded and increased in complexity since 1990 (Brown and 
Potoski 2003; Ni and Bretschneider 2007). Movements such as 
Reinventing Government and the New Public Management 
revised traditional buyer-seller relationships between the public 
and private sector through outsourcing, public-private 
competitions, and public-private partnerships (Gansler 2003). 
Several (e.g., Matthews 2005; Rendon 2005) see this trend as 
elevating the contracting function to a strategic level in public 
agencies.  
Despite contracting importance in public administration, 
scholars through the years have noted and bemoaned its lack of 
tUHDWPHQW DQG FRYHUDJH LQ WKH ILHOG¶V HGXFDWLRQDO SURJUDPV
(Cooper 1980; MacManus and Watson 1990; Snider and Rendon 
2012; Thai 2001). This deficiency contributes, with other factors, 
to a lack of contracting capacity in public organizations, which, as 
we argue in the following section, is an important element of 
effective diversity governance in public agencies.  
 
Contracting Capacity 
As a result of the growing importance and complexity of 
public procurement and its role in achieving public policy 
objectives, emphasis is being placed on developing contracting 
FDSDFLW\GHILQHGDV³WKHFDSDFLWLHVJRYHUQPHQWVQHHGZKHQWKH\
contract with RWKHUVWRGHOLYHUSXEOLFVHUYLFH´%URZQDQG3RWRVNL
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2003, 155; Cohen and Eimicke 2008, 94-95).  These capacities 
arise in individual competence as well as organizational process 
capability, both of which affect the extent to which socio-
economic policy goals are met by an agency.  
Individual contracting competence.  Cohen and Eimicke 
VWUHVVWKDW³WKHFDSDFLW\WRFRQWUDFW´LVDFULWLFDOVNLOOIRU
public managers (123).  Critical contracting skills include 
management tools focused on internal as well as external 
management (e.g., contract management and contractor 
performance management).  When contracting officials do not 
have necessary capacity yet are held responsible for making 
contracting-UHODWHGGHFLVLRQVWKHDJHQF\VXIIHUVIURP³FRUUXSWLRQ
by iQFRPSHWHQFH´   $FFRUGLQJO\ SXEOLF RIILFLDOV PDNLQJ
contracting-related decisions without adequate contracting skills 
UHSUHVHQWVD³GHUHOLFWLRQRIGXW\´D³YLRODWLRQRISXEOLFWUXVW´DQ
³DEXVHRIRIILFH´DQGD³EUHDFKRIHWKLFV´ 
Cooper (2003) discusses contract management capacity in 
terms of well-trained and educated contract managers; he includes 
managers who oversee agencies that contract for supplies and 
services as an aspect of contracting capacity. Brown and Potoski 
(2004) also include as part of contracting capacity the skills 
needed to understand market operations and address market 
failures, knowledge of information gathering (for example, 
contracting practices), and knowledge on stimulating market 
competition (for example, use of contract incentives). 
Contracting process capability.  In addition to individual 
competencies, contract management capacity also includes 
organizational process capability; that is, government agencies not 
only need a competent workforce, but they also need capable 
contracting processes.  The public management literature reflects 
a changing perspective on the importance of organizational 
capacity for contract management.  Public contracting was 
WUDGLWLRQDOO\ WKRXJKWRIDVD³VXEVLGLDU\DGPLQLVWUDWLYH IXQFWLRQ 
WKDWULJKWO\UHFHLYHVOLWWOHDWWHQWLRQIURPVHQLRUDJHQF\OHDGHUVKLS´
(Kelman 2002, 89).  The current literature reflects the contracting 
IXQFWLRQDVEHLQJ LQWHJUDOWRVKDSLQJDQRUJDQL]DWLRQ¶VVWUDWHJ\
)RU H[DPSOH .HOPDQ  UHIHUUHG WR WKH ³VWUDWHgic 
PDQDJHPHQW RI FRQWUDFWLQJ´ ZKHUH FRQWUDFW PDQDJHPHQW





The literature shows that process capability is typically 
identified as a critical success factor in effective contracting 
(Crawford 2002; Frame 1999; Rendon 2012). Brown and Potoski 
(2003) discussed government capacity in terms of three major 
contracting processes²feasibility assessment (the make or buy 
decision), implementation (issuing the solicitation, evaluating 
proposals, and selecting the contractor), and evaluation 
(evaluating contractor performance). Their research showed that 
poor contract performance can result from insufficient 
management capacity in any one of these major processes. 
 
Agencies Lack Contracting Capacity    
Many federal agencies indeed do not have adequate 
contracting capacity, neither in numbers of qualified personnel 
nor in management processes. The DoD, which spends by far the 
largest sums in contracting, exemplifies this lack of capacity.  
Since 2001, the DoD Inspector General has issued over 142 
reports on deficiencies in the DoD procurement process (DODIG 
2009) These reports as well as those by the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO)  have consistently identified 
procurement planning, source selection, contract administration, 
and contractor oversight as problem areas (DODIG 2009; GAO 
2005, 2007).  Because of these deficiencies, the GAO has 
LGHQWLILHG'R'FRQWUDFWPDQDJHPHQWDVD³KLJK-ULVN´DUHDVLQFH
1992 (GAO 2009a). 
One contributing factor has been the lack of qualified 
contracting personnel in the DoD.  Post±Cold War downsizing led 
to a reduction in the size of the acquisition workforce from almost 
500,000 employees in 1990 to about 200,000 in 2006; during the 
VDPHSHULRGWKH'R'¶VSURFXUHPHQWEXGJHWLQFUHDVHGIURP
billion to over $100 billion (Gansler, Lucyshyn, and Arendt 2010, 
2). Both the number of contract actions and the value of those 
actions increased, thus causing more work for fewer contracting 
officials. Shortcuts and errors thus increased, leading to scrutiny 
from both the GAO and the Inspector General.  
Another contributing factor, which is related to the issue 
RI SHUVRQQHO VKRUWDJHV LV WKH UHODWLYH LPPDWXULW\ RI WKH'R'¶V
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organizational contracting processes.  One approach to measuring 
and assessing contracting process maturity is through the use of a 
framework such as the Contract Management Maturity Model 
(CMMM; Rendon 2008).  The CMMM examines key contracting 
process areas, including procurement planning, solicitation 
planning, solicitation, source selection, contract administration, 
and contract closeout.  These processes are assessed at one of five 
levels, from the least mature (Level 1: ad hoc processes that are 
undefined and undocumented) to the most mature (Level 5: 
optimized processes that reflect continual process improvement).  
Recent studies within the DoD indicate that, on the average, the 
process maturity level for the procurement planning, solicitation 
planning, solicitation, and source selection phases is at Level 3, 
while the level for the contract administration and contract 
closeout phases is only at Level 2 (Rendon 2009, 2010, 2011).  
Thus, maturity for DoD processes ranges only from low to 
moderate maturity levels. 
7RVXPPDUL]HWKHH[WHQWWRZKLFKFRQWUDFWLQJ¶VJRDOV²
whether service or product delivery goals or socioeconomic policy 
goals²are achieved depends in large part on the effectiveness of 
agency contracting offices, which in turn depends on their 
contracting capacity. Federal agencies generally suffer from a lack 
of contracting capacity.     
 
C O N T R A C T IN G  
T O PR O M O T E SO C I O E C O N O M I C PO L I C I ES 
 
From an institutional perspective, there has been general 
agreement in the U.S. that SDB merit special treatment; this 
agreement does not, however, extend to the precise nature and 
extent of that special treatment. Reasons for this lack of consensus 
include competing stakeholder voices (i.e., from different SDB 
constituencies) and uncertainty regarding the effectiveness of 
policy options. For example, do SDB derive more benefit from 
loan assistance programs or from public procurement preferences 
(Beaver and Prince 2004; Parker 2002)? 
The literature of law and policy presents conflicting views 
on whether SDB status is an appropriate consideration for public 
procurement decisions.  Some argue that the political nature of 
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SDB preferences make them prohibitively burdensome for 
agencies and their contracting workforces (Schooner 1999; 
Yukins 2010).  Others argue that these preferences are necessary 
to promote competition or economic development (Clark and 
0RXWUD\ 6DOWRQVWDOO  0F&UXGGHQ¶V  Buying 
Social Justice provides a legal and administrative framework for 
reconciling these pRVLWLRQVZLWKWKHFRQFHSWRI³WKHJRYHUQPHQW
DV D FRQVXPHU EX\LQJ VRFLDO MXVWLFH´  +H KROGV WKDW
economic and sociopolitical objectives in government contracting 
can be reconciled based on principles such as transparency, 
integrity, accountability, value for money, and fair and equal 
WUHDWPHQW RI VXSSOLHUV  0F&UXGGHQ DUJXHV WKDW ³WKH
economic and social approaches to procurement are capable of 
being successfully managed together . . . because of the 
DGDSWDELOLW\ RI WKH >SURFXUHPHQW@ LQVWUXPHQW´ whereby 
contracting agencies can exercise discretion to adjust the weights 
of social factors in evaluating bids and proposals (578). 
  
T H E L E G ISL A T I V E A ND R E G U L A T O R Y C O N T E X T 
 
 In this section we address SDB-related laws enacted by 
Congress, as well as the implementing regulations published by 
federal agencies. 
 
Which F irms Qualify as SDB? 
Over the years, Congress and the executive branch have 
developed a complex and not altogether coherent set of SDB 
definitions to reflect various socioeconomic policy priorities, as 
well as to redress discrimination against minorities without 
instituting reverse discrimination against majority members 
(Kidalov and Snider 2011, 8±10).  To qualify as an SDB, a firm 
must, among other requirements, be majority-owned by one or 
more socially and economically disadvantaged citizens. Socially 
disadvantaged individuals are those who have been subjected to 
racial or ethnic prejudice or cultural bias because of their identity 
as a member of a group without regard to their individual qualities.  
Business owners from five groups²Black Americans, Hispanic 
Americans, Native Americans, Asian Pacific Americans, and 
Subcontinent Asian Americans²comprising 37 subgroups are 
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presumed to be socially disadvantaged; non-minorities must 
demonstrate social disadvantage (Code of Federal Regulations 
[CFR] 2012a; 2012b; United States Code [USC] 2012a). 
The Small Business Act defines economically 
disadvantaged individuals DV ³WKRVH VRFLDOO\ GLVDGYDQWDJHG
individuals whose ability to compete in the free enterprise system 
has been impaired due to diminished capital and credit 
opportunities as compared to others in the same business area who 
DUH QRW VRFLDOO\ GLVDGYDQWDJHG´  (USC 2012a). Alaska Native 
Corporations (ANC) are presumed disadvantaged, while Native 
Hawaiian Organizations (NHO) must prove disadvantage. Indian 
tribes must demonstrate disadvantage only for the first tribal-
owned firm (Native American Contractors Association [NACA] 
2012). 
  
SDB Preferences: Goals and Set-asides 
SDB preferences are primarily manifested in legislation 
that establishes goals and set-asides for contract awards.  Small 
business contracting goals have their historical basis in late 1940s 
³IDLU VKDUH´ OHJLVODWLRQ WKDWZDV LQWHQGHG WRUHPHG\ WKHJHQHUDO
lack of opportunities for small businesses in defense procurement 
during World War II (Saltonstall 1957). The Small Business Act 
established two related principles: small businesses should have 
(a ³PD[LPXP SUDFWLFDEOH RSSRUWXQLW\´ WR ZLQ E D ³IDLU
SURSRUWLRQ´ RI IHGHUDO FRQWUDFWV 0D[LPXP SUDFWLFDEOH
opportunity is implemented through actions such as providing 
information on procurement opportunities and reserving certain 
procurement actions only for small businesses. Fair proportion is 
implemented through measures such as contracting and 
subcontracting goals.  
In 1997, Congress set the overall small business goal at 
23% of the total value of all federal prime contract award dollars, 
together with goals for various SDB categories.  The current goals 
expressed as percentages of total prime and subcontract dollars are 
5% for women-owned small businesses and Section 8(a) SDB and 
3% for service-disabled veteran-owned small businesses and 
historically underutilized business zone (HUBzone) small firms.  
While legislation requires that agencies maintain and 
report data on contract dollars and numbers of awards set aside for 
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SDB, no formal sanctions exist if an agency fails to meet its goals.  
Thus, an agency is motivated to achieve its goals to the extent that 
its leaders place emphasis on that achievement, whether from a 
sense of duty or obligation, or perhaps in response to 
administration pressure or SDB advocacy group criticism.   
Especially important components of assistance are set-
asides, which reserve certain contract actions exclusively for 
participation by SDB.  In 1994, Congress amended the Small 
Business Act to automatically set aside all contracts between 
$2,500 and $100,000 for awards to small businesses (currently, 
adjusted for inflation to between $3,000 and $150,000) without 
requiring contracting officers to affirmatively justify set-asides 
WKURXJK WKH ³5XOH RI 7ZR´ DQDO\VLV )HGHUDO $FTXLVLWLRQ
Streamlining Act 1994).2 Several SDB categories (e.g., HUBzone 
firms) are also eligible to receive contracts on a sole-source basis 
(i.e., without competition). 
 
SDB Assistance Programs: Section 8(a) and Section 1207  
7KH 6PDOO %XVLQHVV $FW¶V DXWKRULW\ IRU PLQRULW\
preferences in contracting was not exercised before the period of 
civil²particularly urban²unrest during the late 1960s.  The 
.HUQHU &RPPLVVLRQ¶V  UHSRUW RQ WKRVH HYHQWV IRXQG WKDW
disadvantaged individuals enjoyed no appreciable ownership of 
small businesses and did not share in the community 
redevelopment process, and it recommended actions to increase 
business ownership by minorities so that they would have better 
opportunities to share materially in competitive free enterprise 
(Kerner Commission 1968). President Johnson responded by 
directing that the SBA use the authority in Section 8(a)3 of the 
Small Business Act to direct contracts to businesses located in 
distressed urban communities in order to create jobs.  President 
Nixon subsequently directed the SBA to change the emphasis of 
                                                                                                            
2 The rule of two refers to set-asides for contracts over a certain dollar 
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the Section 8(a) program from hiring the unemployed in the inner 
city to developing successful small businesses owned by 
disadvantaged persons.  In 1978, Congress codified the Section 
8(a) program in response to perceptions that it was failing because 
it lacked a legislative basis (Dynalantic Corporation v. 
Department of Defense et al. 2012).  
In the similar way that different disadvantaged groups 
have different contract award goals, the Section 8(a) program 
made different provisions for different groups. For example, until 
recently, unlimited sole source awards could be made without 
justification only to ANC firms (a provision that figures 
prominently in our later case study); ANC sole source awards now 
required heightened justification for contract values over $20 
million (FAR 2012). For firms onwed by other groups such as 
Blacks and Hispanics, sole source awards are limited to $6.5 
million for manufacturing contracts and $4 million of all other 
awards (FAR 2012, 19.805-1). As we note below, differing 
preferences for different groups lead to tensions among members 
of the groups and the agencies who award them contracts.  
In 1987, Congress enacted an SDB program known as 
Section 1207 for the DoD, NASA, and the Coast Guard (USC 
2012b).  This program supplements the Small Business Act with 
various procurement set-asides, evaluation preferences, technical 
assistance, and incentives, with special DoD-only terms.  The 
DoD SDB Program originally established set-asides, 5% prime 
contracting and subcontracting goals, and a price evaluation 
adjustment up to 10% in favor of SDB proposals and bids in 
unrestricted competitions (Dynalantic Corporation v. Department 
of Defense et al. 2012).   
 
 
SDB Preferences: The Dark Side 
As with any complex legal-regulatory regime, effective 
implementation of SDB preferences and assistance programs 
faces a variety of challenges.  One challenge is seen in the nature 
of the SDB industry, which is not monolithic but rather balkanized 
among several disparate minority groups; the SDB contracting 
terrain is therefore contested. SDB awards necessarily create 
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winners and losers, thus the context of SDB contracting is highly 
politically charged (Ivory 2012).  
Additionally, minority contracting preferences create 
incentives for non-SDB firms to manipulate the rules or, worse, to 
engage in fraud by misrepresenting their size or ownership.  The 
SDB definitions framework mentioned previously has safeguards 
against fraud and manipulation, including small-firm status 
appeals and protests of contract awards; regulations on affiliation 
with large businesses; and criminal and civil penalties for 
misrepresentation (CFR 2010). Still, loopholes exist for large 
firms to receive small business contract awards and for agencies 
to receive credit toward goal achievement for those awards.  
The extent to which the benefits of SDB contracting 
preferences have actXDOO\JRQHWRODUJHRU³IURQW´EXVLQHVVHVKDV
also been noted and criticized (ASBL 2012; Weigelt 2012a). 
Small business advocacy groups have accused the SBA of 
concealing the extent to which awards intended for small 
businesses are actually going to large firms because of reporting 
errors, inadequate verification of eligibility, or other procedural 
shortcuts by agencies or the SBA (Castelli 2007).  
Other implementation challenges in SDB contracting 
reflect the tensions that stem from competing values that are 
embodied in competing policy objectives. For example, tensions 
naturally arise between SDB preferences and fair competition 
principles (Thai 2001). Policy tensions are also illustrated by the 
LVVXHRIFRQWUDFWFRQVROLGDWLRQRU³EXQGOLQJ´*$27KH 
practice of bundling several small procurement actions into one 
large contract is commonly justified as enabling savings through 
volume buying as well as through lower administrative costs (e.g., 
a smaller procurement staff; Bowman et al. 2006; Rendon 2005). 
Typically, however, bundling puts individual SDB at a 
disadvantage because only large firms or teams of firms are able 
to bid successfully on large contracts. 
Such issues illustrate how the diversity governance 
challenge in minority contracting exemplifies classic public 
administration tensions between managerial efficiency and 
political responsiveness (Loader 2007). Thus, as with other areas 
of public policy, SDB public procurement objectives are often 
contested, unclear, or misaligned. As a result, policy-makers and 
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administrators in procurement face difficult choices regarding 
SDB and, ideally, make sound decisions²both economic and 
social²under a variety of institutional pressures.  
When faced with these challenges, however, and in the 
absence of adequate contracting capacity, it is unsurprising that 
agency contracting officials would take maximum advantage of 
the expedited authorities in SDB preferences as a way to reduce 
their transaction costs (Yukins 2010). While obviously benefitting 
SDB, preferences also serve to ease workload on the contracting 
workforces in federal agencies.  SDB preferences allow 
contracting officials to limit competition to fewer firms and, in 
some cases, to avoid competition outright, each of which means 
fewer bids or proposals to process and evaluate.  Of course, the 
putative purpose of these preferences is to aid SDB, not to reduce 
agency workload. To the extent that agencies use preferences to 
reduce or avoid work, they do not govern diversity in the public 
interest but rather serve their own internal interests; minority 
awards are simply consequences rather than objectives.    
 
T H E JUDI C I A L C O N T E X T : C O UR T D E C ISI O NS O N 
SDB PR E F E R E N C ES 
 
Judicial decisions in several important cases pertain to 
this issue: City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson (1989), Adarand 
Constructors, Inc. v. Peña (1995), Rothe Development 
Corporation v. Department of Defense and Department of the Air 
Force (2008), and Dynalantic Corporation v. Department of 
Defense et al. (2012).   In general, these cases highlight the strict 
scrutiny standard of review for government actions based on a 
suspect classification. This standard focuses on whether a 
program or policy that relies on a suspect classification (here, 
race) meets a compelling government interest and whether it is 
narrowly tailored to meet its objectives. 
 In Croson, a 1989 decision that had major impacts on state 
and local jurisdictions (Rice 1993), the Supreme Court ruled that 
5LFKPRQG¶VVHW-aside program for minority-owned businesses to 
receive municipal contracts was unconstitutional under the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Applying the 
strict scrutiny standard, the Court found that Richmond had 
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neither proved that remedial action was required nor that other 
race-neutral remedies would be ineffective. The Court suggested 
WKDWDMXULVGLFWLRQ¶V minority preference program could bear strict 
scrutiny by means of analysis based on the disparity between 
qualified minority contractors and available contractors and the 
extent to which the jurisdiction contributed to a pattern of minority 
exclusion. (Rice and Mongkuo 1998, 85; see also Rice 1992 for 
an analysis of disparity studies). 
 The 1995 Adarand decision invoked the strict scrutiny 
standard for federal preference programs.  As Rice and Mongkuo 
 SXW LW ³Adarand federalized Croson « >E@\ KROGing 
federal preference programs to the same level of strict scrutiny as 
VWDWHDQGORFDOSURJUDPV´$WLVVXHZDVDUDFH-based Section 
8(a) subcontracting provision that the plaintiff claimed was a 
discriminatory violation of the Equal Protection Clause.  To 
determine whether this provision was narrowly tailored, the Court 
examined whether it was reviewed using the strict scrutiny 
VWDQGDUGWKURXJKVXFKPHDQVDV³FRQVLGHUDWLRQRIWKHXVHRIrace-
neutral means [emphasis added] to increase minority business 
SDUWLFLSDWLRQ´ 86&&5 L[ 7KXV UDFH-neutral strategies 
must be considered before adopting any race-based preferences.  
2QO\ PRQWKV DIWHU WKH &RXUW¶V GHFLVLRQ WKH
Department of Justice noted the difficulties that Adarand 
presented to federal agencies:   
The structure of affirmative action in contracting. 
. .will not be simple to implemHQW«$JHQFLHV will 
have to make judgments and observe limitations 
in the use of race-conscious measures, and 
make concentrated  race-neutral  efforts  that  are  
not  required  under  current  practice. (USCCR 
2005, ix) 
Rice and Mongkuo (1998) agreed, predicting that federal 
programs would undergo increasing equal protection challenges, 
and to survive strict scrutiny, those programs would have to be 
defended with Croson-like disparity analysis that showed a strong 
basis in evidence of minority exclusion.  Further, they pointed out 
the significant methodological and implementation challenges in 
employing such analysis at the federal level as compared to 
analysis for local jurisdictions like Richmond as envisioned by the 
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Court in Croson.  Anticipating that federal programs would have 
difficulty employing disparity analysis and hence in meeting the 
strict scrutiny standard, they concluded that the Adarand decision 
KDG³GHDOWDVHYHUHEORZ´5LFHDQG0XQJNXRWRIHGHUDO
SDB preference programs.        
 In the 2008 Rothe GHFLVLRQ WKH'R'¶V aforementioned 
Section 1207 program was declared unconstitutional by the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. A provision of this 
program allowed the agency to give a preference to an SDB by 
reducing its bid price by 10%. When this discount allowed a SDB 
owned by Korean Americans to win a contract over a Caucasian 
woman-owned firm, that firm filed suit, alleging a violation of 
equal protection.  The Court agreed, ruling that Congress did not 
have sufficient evidence of race-based discrimination when it 
authorized the Section 1207 program.  Specifically, it found that 
the disparity analysis on which the agency relied was first, flawed 
methodologically and second, not sufficiently broad so as to 
provide a strong basis in evidence as required by the strict scrutiny 
standard (Feder and Manuel 2009).  This decision affected only 
the Section 1207 program and did not reach to the Section 8(a) 
program.  
 In its recent Dynalantic decision, the U.S. District Court 
for the District of Columbia found that the Section 8(a) program 
is not unconstitutional on its face because Congress, when it 
authorized the program, had disparity analysis-based evidence of 
discrimination against minority groups in receiving federal 
contracts.  The Court found, however, that Congress had no strong 
basis of evidence of discrimination in the particular industry 
sector²the military simulation and training industry²in which 
the disputed award occurred.  The Court therefore issued an 
injunction barring the DoD and the SBA from using Section 8(a) 
preferences in that industry sector.  It also found that the DoD and 
Congress had established evidence of discrimination against 
minorities only in 13 of over 1,000 existing industry categories 
(Dynalantic Corporation v. Department of Defense et al. 2012; 
Rothe Development Corporation v. Department of Defense and 
Department of the Air Force 2008; Kidalov 2011). This ruling, of 
course, raises the possibility for future challenges of Section 8(a) 
awards to SDB in dozens of industry sectors in other federal 
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agencies, each of which would have to present that same strong 
basis in evidence in order to survive the strict scrutiny standard.     
 Considered together, these decisions indicate a 
progressive narrowing of authorities for SDB preferences as well 
as expansion of requirements for demonstrating evidence of 
disparity.  As a result, one would expect that the discretion of 
contracting officials would be restricted and the administrative 
workload of agencies increased, with the logical consequence of 
an overall reduction in SDB awards, as predicted by Rice and 
Mungkuo (1998).  
 
F E D E R A L A G E N C Y SDB A W A RDS 
 
Despite predictions to the contrary, the number and values 
of SDB contracts have actually continued to increase.  Figure 1 
shows the increase in total federal prime contract spending since 
1984 and, more notably, the generally increasing percentages of 
that spending in Section 8(a) awards. Figure 2 also shows 
increases in recent total SDB awards and Section 8(a) awards, 
both in total dollars and in the number of awards.4 What accounts 
for this unexpected result?   
In a 2005 report, the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights 
found that federal agencies generally have not narrowly tailored 
their preference programs by considering race-neutral alternatives 
as required by the Supreme Court in Adarand, nor have they made 
WKH ³FRQFHQWUDWHG UDFH-QHXWUDO HIIRUWV´ HQYLVLRQHG E\ WKH
Department of Justice in its post-Adarand opinion (USCCR 2005, 
ix). Noting that neither the Court nor the Department of Justice 
had provided any guidance for agencies, the USCCR found that 
agencies essentially operate on their own (x). Further, it found 
disagreement among agencies on the factors that make a program 
either race-conscious or race-neutral (xi).  As a result, agencies 
                                                                                                            
4 Data also show drops in SDB or 8(a) spending, or both, during the 
two last fiscal years.  SDB and 8(a) DoD contract actions also dropped.  This 
decline period commenced after federal courts in Rothe issued their decisions (in 
2008 and 2009) invalidating and enjoining the Section 1207 program.  The 
decline also follows increased congressional attention to abuses in the 8(a) 
program, especially for ANCs (GAO 2006).   
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rely on the preference programs and goals already established by 
Congress and on programs such as Section 8(a) rather than devote 
efforts to develop their own programs or conduct their own 
analysis (xiii). 
)XUWKHU &RQJUHVV KDV IDLOHG WR UHVSRQG WR WKH FRXUWV¶
decisions with new legislation to guide agency actions.  One may 
speculate that the reason for this inaction is that Congress realizes 
WKDWDJHQFLHVGRQRWKDYHUHVRXUFHVWRPHHWWKHFRXUWV¶VWDQGDUGV
From this perspective, legislative inaction signals to agencies that 
they may continue to use existing SDB preferences while 
HIIHFWLYHO\LJQRULQJWKHFRXUWV¶GHFLVLRQV 
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Misuse of SDB Preferences for Administrative Convenience 
The misuse of SDB preferences as a tool of contracting 
RIILFHUV¶ DGPLQLVWUDWLYH FRQYHQLHQFH UDWKHU WKDQ DV D WRRO RI
addressing past discrimination, has been frequently highlighted in 
the press, Congressional hearings, and GAO and Inspectors 
General investigations.  (HSGAC 2009).  These reports are 
frequently focused on misuse of Section 8(a) SDB preferences for 
ANCs because of the peculiar contracting flexibilities afforded by 
laws and regulations when dealing with that category (HSGAC 
2009; HSBC/HOGR 2006; GAO 2006b; SSBC 2005).  Until 
recently, those flexibilities included unlimited sole source awards 
not subject to justification and approval (GAO 2006b).  
Table 1 shows the sharp increase in ANC, Native Hawaiian, and 
tribal awards during recent years compared to more gradual 
increases for awards to Black- and Hispanic-owned firms.  Again, 
these figures should be interpreted in light of increasing DoD 
budgets (along with increasing contract awards) as well as a lack 
of agency contracting capacity (Ivory 2012).   
 
Table 1 
Comparison of DoD Individual Minority-Owned Business 











FY2011 $4.43 $5.35 $6.87 
FY2010 $4.52 $5.67 $5.41 
FY2009 $4.72 $5.45 $4.35 
FY2008 $3.61 $4.39 $2.91 
FY2007 $2.65 $3.48 $0.47 
FY2006 $2.22 $2.47 $0.23 





C ASE ST UD Y : H URRI C A N E K A T RIN A R E C O V E R Y 
C O N T R A C T IN G 




The Army Corps of Engineers (the Corps) was the lead 
DoD agency responsible for Hurricane Katrina recovery and 
reconstruction contracts.  Because of the socio-economic 
demographics and history of directly affected states, Hurricane 
Katrina contracts held significant potential for use of SDB 
preferences in accordance with the original intent of Congress to 
redress past discrimination and economic disadvantage in 
minority communities ± specifically, African-American 
communities.  Yet the DoD 8(a) SDB program, as administered 
by the Corps, failed to deliver the policy, economic, and 
contracting outcomes for which it was intended, as this case 
illustrates.   
To have the full context for this procurement, we must 
consider the socio-economic situation of the affected areas.  In 
particular, Hurricane Katrina took a heavy toll on the poor and on 
African Americans. The Congressional Research Service (CRS) 
HVWLPDWHG ³WKDW RQH-fifth of those displaced by the storm were 
likely to have been poor, and 30% had incomes that were below 
1½ times the poverty line. African Americans are estimated to 
KDYH DFFRXQWHG IRU DSSUR[LPDWHO\  RI WKH VWRUP YLFWLPV´
(2005, i). Of over 695,000 Katrina victims, approximately 
178,000 were African-Americans living below the poverty level.  
(CRS 2005: 16).  Indeed, prior to Katrina, the affected areas were 
some of the most socio-economically disadvantaged in the nation.  
To use the 8(a) program in a manner consistent with the 
court decisions discussed earlier, the Corps was obligated to cite 
discriminatory barriers to competition by minority firms, as well 
as evidence of negative disparities in minority participation in 
public contracting.  Of course, any discrimination against small 
businesses in Mississippi at the time of Hurricane Katrina would 
have been overwhelmingly directed against African-American 
firms, not Alaska Native firms.  The share of minority-owned 
businesses (mostly Black-owned businesses) among all 
Mississippi businesses ranged from 16 percent in 2002 (Jackson 
Advocate 2013) to 18 percent in 2007, while American Indian and 
Alaska Native-owned firms stood at approximately 0.3 percent of 
all Mississippi firms in both 2002 and 2007 data. (USCB 2012, 
2002).  However, various post-Katrina investigations and reviews 
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showed that fully 99 percent of the value of Katrina-related 
contracts awarded by the Corps to SDB went to ANCs, thus 
effectively excluding almost all local SDB owned by African-
Americans. (SSBC 2005, 87; HSBC/HOGR 2006, 177).  The 
&RUSV¶SRUWDEOHFODVVURRPVDFRQWUDFWLOOXVWUDWHVZK\DQGKRZ
such exclusions occurred. 
  In September 2005, the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency (FEMA) delegated to the Corps the award of a contract 
for 450 portable classrooms in Mississippi within a span of less 
than two months.   (SSBC 2005, 58-59).  Several options were 
available to the Corps to execute this contract.   
First, the Corps could have executed a sole source award 
based on an urgent and compelling need (FAR 2005, 6.302-2).  
However, this option would have required the contracting officer 
to accomplish two additional time- and resource-consuming tasks: 
(1) obtain a justification and approval for the award from a senior 
official, and (2) solicit offers from as many sources as practicable 
under the circumstances.   
Second, the Corps could have broken up the requirement 
into several pieces and awarded sole source awards to non-ANC 
8(a) firms (FAR 2005, 6.302-5(b)(4)).  However, this option 
would have required the contracting officer to make several 
individual awards, which would have significantly increased 
workload and required additional staff to meet the classroom 
delivery schedule.   
Third, the Corps could have conducted a competitive 8(a) 
procurement (FAR 2005, 19.805).  This option would have 
required publication of an open solicitation for competitive bids. 
Even with an expedited process for receiving and evaluating bids, 
this option increased the time and effort to award the contract.  
All three options would have required the Corps to 
conduct market research for the intended contract award (FAR 
2005, Part 10). Options two and three would have required SBA 
review and approval of eligibility of the selected 8(a) firms; 
however, eligibility could have been limited to local 8(a) firms in 
Mississippi (FAR 2005,19.804-2, 52.219-18).   
In addition, as discussed earlier the Corps was bound by 
Adarand to limit eligibility to firms with ownership that was 
subject to minority participation disparities ± in this case, most 
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likely to Black-owned local firms.  In subsequent Congressional 
hearings, however, the Corps produced no record of any disparity 
studies.     
The Corps chose none of the above options, did not collect 
or review data for minority participation disparities in Mississippi 
public contracting, and instead made an 8(a) sole source award to 
a North Carolina-based ANC firm which then subcontracted to a 
Florida firm.   
According to Corps officials, the agreement was selected 
because it could be used to quickly procure the 
FODVVURRPV«'XH WR >WKH ILUP¶V@ VWDWXV DV DQ $ODVND
Native corporation under the 8(a) program, the company 
could be awarded contracts²without competition²for 
any dollar value. (GAO 2006: 5).  
Congressional reviews also showed that the SBA approved this 
D$1&DZDUGZLWKRXWDQ\UHJDUGIRU³WKHLQWHQWDQGSXUSRVH´
of the 8(a) program or for preferences to local small or 
disadvantaged businesses.  (SSBC 2005: 87).  The agency 
contracting officer stated to a GAO investigator that she was not 
involved in reviewing the contract terms and simply signed the 
contract.  (HSBC/HOGR 2006: 168).  
 
Discussion 
This case and the overall DoD performance on SDB 
participation with regards to Katrina contracts demonstrate the 
failure of the DoD acquisition officials to use the 8(a) SDB 
program for its intended purposes to redress racial discrimination.  
Rather, because of their extensive use of the unlimited sole-source 
privileges for 8(a) ANCs, the 8(a) program in this case did not 
serve the poor and minorities in the affected areas of Louisiana, 
Mississippi, and Alabama.  
In this case, the contracting function of public 
administration was presented with a clear opportunity to promote 
social equity: to serve a needy and historically disadvantaged 
population with direct economic benefit through contract awards 
to local minority-owned businesses. In this case it is clear that the 
majority of the contracted work, and thus the dollar value of the 
contract, would have stayed in the local distressed areas if those 
firms had received the awards. Unfortunately, however, the award 
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went to an Alaskan-owned SDB in North Carolina and its 
subcontractor in Florida, two states unaffected by Katrina. 
Ultimately then, the contracting function succeeded in awarding a 
contract to provide portable classrooms, but it failed to seize the 
opportunity to promote social equity among the victims of 
Hurricane Katrina. 
7KH &RUSV¶ FODVVURRP FRQWUDFW FDVH reflects an 
environment in which contracting strategies are not selected 
primarily for the purpose of meeting socioeconomic policy 
objectives, but rather for the purpose of convenience, expedience, 
DQGHIILFLHQF\ 7KHIHGHUDOJRYHUQPHQW¶VLQFUHDVHGFRQWUDcting 
workload coupled with a downsized and inexperienced 
contracting workforce has resulted in federal agencies having 
limited contracting capacity, in terms of competent individuals 
and capable processes.  Thus, it is no surprise that government 
agencies look for the most convenient and expeditious routes to 
award contracts.   
We should note that we do not fault the individuals 
involved in this particular case.  Rather, by all accounts they were 
doing their best under extremely stressful conditions of high 
contract volume, urgent requirements, and staffing constraints.  
Nor do we fault the Corps, as it operates under similar staffing and 
budgetary constraints.  Rather, our main concern is whether it is 
possible to avoid similar occurrences in the future, and if so, how.              
 
 
DISC R E T I O N A ND DI V E RSI T Y G O V E RN A N C E IN SDB 
C O N T R A C T IN G 
 
 The preceding analysis highlights the challenges in 
diversity governance for public administrators who serve as 
agency contracting officials.  While there exists a clear overall 
policy emphasis to promote SDB via contracting, it has been 
manifested in a complex amalgam of programs, goals, and 
preferences for a variety of disparate groups.  Recent court 
decisions have called that overall emphasis, as well as specific 
programs, into question. Neither Congress, nor the administration, 
nor the courts, however, have provided substantive direction to 
agencies on how to proceed. In light of both this policy ambiguity 
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and their increasing contract workloads, it is unsurprising that 
agencies have continued to use existing authorities, especially 
considering their lack of contracting capacity.     
 In our view, such an environment of complexity, 
uncertainty, and conflict places a premium on the administrative 
discretion of the individual contracting official for effective 
diversity governance.  Only if contracting officials are both 
equipped with and able to exercise sound professional judgment, 
political sensitivity, and cultural competence with they be able to 
make award decisions that promote social equity consistent with 
legislative and judicial intents.   To what extent is the exercise of 
professional discretion²and thus diversity governance²possible 
in this environment?    
During the mid-twentieth century, the scholars Carl 
Friedrich and Herman Finer carried on a debate in the public 
administration literature on the issue of how to ensure 
accountability and political responsiveness among public 
administrators (Finer 1940; Friedrich 1940).  Finer argued that 
rules and regulations were necessary to constrain the discretion 
and actions of unelected bureaucrats, while Friedrich held that 
SXEOLF VHUYDQWV¶ GLVFUHWLRQ FRXOG EH JXLGHG IURP ZLWKLQ IRU
example by their sense of duty and professional judgment.  This 
debate remains relevant today in the context of SDB contracting 
7KRVHZKR UHIOHFW )ULHGULFK¶V SRVLWLRQ LQFOXGH.elman (1990), 
who argued that procurement rules unnecessarily constrain 
discretion and force administrators into less-than-optimal 
decisions, as well as Cohen and Eimicke (2008), who argued that 
contracting officials are responsible for protecting the public 
interest in an increasingly outsourced government. Schooner 
(2001) and Daniels (2002) took the side of Finer to argue that 
discretion in contracting should be subject to oversight and 
controls to ensure the promotion of broader public priorities rather 
than narrow agency interests.  
As revealed in this paper, however, the discretion of 
federal agency contracting officials has actually been severely 
curtailed, although not in a Fineran sense to ensure accountability 
and responsiveness through rules. Rather, their discretion is 
restricted by the lack of organizational contracting capacity that 
forces them to make decisions mainly on the basis of workload 
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and transaction cost reductions.  Faced with increasing numbers 
of contract actions, personnel shortages, and immature contracting 
processes, contracting officials take the easy way out by relying 
on existing SDB preferences.  Accountability and responsiveness 
take a backseat to convenience and expedience; given the 
circumstances, this outcome should be expected. 
As a consequence, diversity governance in federal 
contracting also suffers.  Contract awards are not made with a 
sensitivity to and recognition of socioeconomic policy objectives 
but rather with an eye toward efficiency.  Major issues in diversity 
governance, such as $GDUDQG¶V shift from race-based to race-
neutral contracting strategies, are distractions rather than central 
concerns.  Thus, we question the extent to which administrative 
discretion can be exercised in this current contracting environment 
and, hence, also the extent to which diversity may be governed 
through SDB contracting.    
 
C O N C L USI O N: BUI L DIN G C O N T R A C T IN G C APA C I T Y 
 
Earlier, we discussed two necessary elements of 
contracting capacity: workforce competence and organizational 
process capability.  Clearly, a well-educated, trained, and 
experienced workforce of sufficient size is called for to enable 
agencies to meet their procurement socioeconomic objectives and 
public policy goals.  However, these remedies are not without 
challenges.   
 One challenge concerns the relative dearth of either 
procurement content or social equity content in American 
programs of public administration education (Rice 1993; Snider 
and Rendon 2012; each provides recommendations for enhancing 
education programs in these two areas.).  Unless both of these 
shortcomings are addressed, graduates of MPA programs will be 
ill-equipped to serve as diversity-governing contracting officials.   
Another challenge is in the always-constrained resources 
(mainly funding) for recruitment, retention, and training of 
contracting professionals.  Further, before training can be 
designed, analysis such as needs assessments must be 
accomplished. Although the DoD has had significant training 
programs for contracting personnel in place since the early 1990s, 
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the GAO has found that the DoD lacks complete information on 
the skillsets of its current workforce and on whether these skillsets 
are sufficient to accomplish its missions (GAO 2009b). 
Additionally, recent studies have shown a mismatch between the 
'R'¶V FRQWUDFWLQJ WUDLQLQJ FXUULFXOD DQG WKH DFWXDO FRQWUDFWLQJ
environment and requirements faced by the contracting workforce 
(Aufderheide, Corrigan, and Maloy 2011).   
 The main challenge that we perceive, however, is 
overcoming the inertia of the status quo. No significant 
environmental force has appeared or is on the horizon that would 
provide impetus for building agency contracting capacity. While 
new federal contracting employees are being hired to replace those 
lost in the 1990s downsizing, the workforce size is unlikely to 
keep pace with the anticipated rise in federal spending (Gansler 
and Lucyshyn 2010). 
The federal SDB contracting environment seems at 
present to represent something of an equilibrium among all major 
participants in which each gets something of value: SDB receive 
contract awards (albeit by convenience rather than by need or 
disadvantage); policy-makers can claim that they support SDB; 
and agencies get their contracting work accomplished.  While the 
situation exhibits a certain pragmatic efficiency, in our view, it 
also reflects an impoverished public administration²one that is 
incapable of diversity governance. 
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